

wholly different from that of lifeless objects. All living organisms seem to possess, in some degree, the faculty of selection, and are able to discover ways of circumventing difficulties. Air bubbles which are prevented from rising in water, simply press themselves against the obstacle; animal-cules will find a path round its edge.

According to one school—the "determinist school"—of thought, spontaneity, or free will, is non-existent, and our impression that we can direct our thoughts or our actions is entirely fallacious. We are automata, and every idea that enters our minds, every act of our behaviour, is imposed upon us by our instincts, or our habits, or is the inevitable consequence of our sensations or our memories. Determinist philosophers not only maintain that we are the result of forces which are in theory calculable, but that it is logically unthinkable that we should possess any initiative. Yet, if one who is intellectually convinced by these arguments will look into his own mind, he will find there an ineradicable idea that, as a matter of fact, he is endowed with a will and can exercise it freely. Introspective observation refuses to accept the conclusions of logic; but we need not conclude that introspection is misleading. Logic traces effects back to causes, and formulates, as a natural law, the invariable connection of a particular effect with a particular cause. But the effects of Life are so complicated

and elusive that they cannot be reduced to rule with the precision that is attainable in dealing with inanimate matter; and, in classifying its manifestations the logician is apt to mistake conditioning circumstances for ultimate causes. He might, for instance, conclude that I had joined a golf club because the links were close at my door, whereas the real cause was that I had